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IG: Poland

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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National	intelligence	Utticers

NFAC #1852-81 1 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

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Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT

: Interagency Group Meeting on Poland -- 31 March 1981

1.		and I at	tended an	IG meeting	on Tuesd	lav.
31 March	at the State Depai	tment.	The subjec	t was long	er-term	
politica	l military measures	in resp	onse to a	Soviet inv	asion of	
	The meeting was ch				<u>nt</u> atives	of
all natio	onal security agend	cies were	in attend	ance.		

- 2. Burt stressed that the task of this IG is not to address crisis management or short-term contingency measures but rather to plan for longer-term military responses growing out of crisis management. In short, a Soviet invasion of Poland would create politically propitious circumstances for the implementation of longer-term military measures in NATO and elsewhere. MG Schweitzer of the NSC staff stressed that our objective should be achieving the force goals which now exist, both with respect to NATO (in particular the Long-Term Defense Plan, TNF modernization, and other military objectives), rather than establishing new objectives. Burt stressed that we needed, nevertheless, to prioritize among our present objectives.
- 3. Burt disaggregated seven categories of measures for consideration by the group. The first two focused on short-term military actions such as a cautionary alert, and included refugee relief measures. The other measures which were discussed:
 - -- Budgetary decisions involving expanded funding for current or new defense programs.
 - -- Manpower decisions, involving build up of active and reserve forces, possibly through some form of national service (The issue under discussion here is reinstitution of the draft.)

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- -- Deployment of sensitive new weapons systems to Europe (In this context two issues were discussed. First, would a Soviet invasion make deployment of ERW in Europe more politically palatable. While Schweitzer supported deployment of ERW, he expressed doubt that the military capability we would achieve would be worth the anticipated political costs, possibly losing approval for LRTNF deployment. A second issue raised by Burt was the advisability of using the Polish invasion to break the linkage between LRTNF deployment and arms control.)
- -- Political military steps in Europe (vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, Romania, France).

 Out of area	actions,	involving	either	force	disposi	itions,	<u>economi</u> c
or political	steps, m	nilitary su	upply, a	and/or	covert	action.	

4. Burt's office will produce a draft paper drawing on the discussion to state policy objectives and refine policy options. This will be considered in another IG for eventual transmission to Walt Stoessel's SIG on Poland. No covert action was or will be discussed by this IG.

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Attachments:

Papers discussed at IG

A. Possible Political Military Steps Which the USG
Might Take in Response to Soviet Intervention in Poland

B. Poland: US/NATO Long-Term Military Response